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Abstract 
We analyse the relationship between corporate dividend policy and firm lifecycle in a low-disclosure 
regime, where domestic firms have an incentive to use dividends to build capital market reputation among 
external investors. We use a range of lifecycle indicators from the extant literature and find that, as 
predicted by the lifecycle model, dividend payouts increase along the lifecycle until peaking in the mature 
stage. Furthermore, dividends are positively related to growth opportunities. In all lifecycle stages, firms 
with relatively larger growth opportunities pay relatively larger dividends. We find that firms in low-
disclosure regimes, engage in reputation-building behaviour, not just in the early stages of their lifecycle 
but also in the mature stage. 
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Introduction 
 
 The lifecycle model of dividends postulates that a firm’s dividend payout policy is a function of 
their lifecycle stage. Early empirical studies of dividend policy, though not explicitly focusing on the 
lifecycle model, identified key characteristics of dividend-paying firms that are consistent with the 
prediction of the lifecycle model. For example, studies by Fama and French (2001) and Grullon et al. 
(2005) offer indirect support for this model as they find dividend initiators exhibit mature tendencies; 
they are large, profitable, and have positive free cash flow for distribution to shareholders. Furthermore, 
Brockman and Unlu (2009) show that dividend-paying growth firms pay smaller dividends compared to 
dividend-paying mature firms. 
 DeAngelo et al. (2006) explicitly test the dividend-lifecycle relationship by employing a single 
lifecycle measure, namely the ratio of retained to total equity, RE/TE. They argue that as firms mature 
this ratio increases for two reasons. First, as firms grow and become profitable RE increases. Second, 
their reliance on contributed equity falls as their investment opportunity set diminishes, and this coupled 
with growing profitability means that firms can substitute retained for external equity. Based on a sample 
of U.S. firms, DeAngelo et al. (2006) present empirical evidence that corporate dividend payouts follow a 
distinct lifecycle pattern, with a positive monotonic relationship between RE/TE and the likelihood of 
paying a dividend. Mature firms with large RE/TE are most likely to pay a dividend. Subsequent studies 
show that this also applies to other developed markets (Denis and Osobov, 2008); and to the dividend 
amount and not just to the likelihood of paying a dividend (Brockman and Unlu, 2009).  
 A connected strand of literature relates corporate dividend policy to country-level institutions 
and disclosure standards. Beck et al. (2006) show that country-level institutional development is inversely 
related to financing obstacles, prompting firms to implement their own strategies to overcome these 
obstacles. Brockman and Unlu (2011) test the lifecycle-inclusive disclosure standards versions of the 
agency outcome and substitution models of dividends (La Porta et al., 2000) and find that the ‘dividend-
payout-disclosure standards’ relationship is u-shaped. The probability of paying a dividend is highest 
when disclosure standards are either weak or strong. Where disclosure standards are weak, the costs of 
debt and equity capital are often prohibitively high (see Botosan, 1997; and Sengupta, 1998 for the link 
between disclosure quality and the cost of capital). In such countries, growth firms respond by 
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establishing a history of paying large dividends to foster trust with outside investors and build capital 
market reputation.1 This reduces financing constraints and allows them to grow (Gan et al., 2013).2 Where 
disclosure standards are strong, the cost of capital is lower implying that firms have less need to engage in 
reputation-building strategies. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the lifecycle model of dividends 
receives empirical support in countries with high disclosure standards, e.g. DeAngelo et al. (2006) and 
Denis and Osobov (2008) among others. Interestingly, Brockman and Unlu (2011) report similar findings 
for low-disclosure regimes. They find that the likelihood of paying a dividend increases with RE/TE but 
do not address the issue of whether or not the dividend amount varies over the firm lifecycle. Shao et al. 
(2013) show that RE/TE is positively and statistically significantly related to being a dividend payer but 
statistically indistinguishable from zero using dividends-to-sales (the dividend amount), in countries where 
creditor rights are weak. However, it remains an unanswered question if the magnitude of dividends 
differs between mature and growth firms in countries with low-disclosure requirements, where dividends 
may be used to establish capital market reputation. Arguably it is the size of the dividend that provides 
the strongest signal of a firm’s intent to protect prospective shareholders, thus incentivising firms with 
greater growth potential to pay larger dividends.3  
In this paper, we build on these two strands of the literature to address two issues. Firstly, we test 
the lifecycle model of dividends using data from Korea, a country with low-disclosure standards relative 
to developed markets, focusing on both the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount. 
Secondly, we try to reconcile the dividend-lifecycle relationship with the reputation-building strategies 
pursued by firms in countries with weak institutions. Ignoring reputation-building motives, the extant 
literature suggests that mature companies pay larger dividends than growth companies. However, where 
these motives are strong, early-stage firms may potentially pay comparable or larger dividends than their 
                                                 
1 Using dividend payouts to build external financing capacity is also highlighted by Masters et al. (2016). Using a 
sample of publicly-traded U.S. firms, they show that contrary to conventional wisdom, financially constrained firms 
pay dividends, and increase their dividend immediately prior to a SEO announcement.  
2 The notion that firms can build capital market reputation using dividend payout is not new. Campbell and Turner 
(2011) find evidence in support of the agency substitution model of dividends in Victorian Britain.  
3 Using large dividends to build reputation involves a trade-off for corporate insiders. Since expropriation risk is 
higher in countries with weak legal protection/disclosure standards, insiders forgo large private gains by paying large 
dividends rather than retaining the funds. However, if this form of reputation building is effective in reducing firm-
level financing constraints, corporate insiders gain as the value of their (legal) cash flow rights increases as firms 
fund growth opportunities. Outside investors are prepared to fund these growth opportunities as the dividend signal 
is deemed both costly (for insiders) and credible. The larger the dividend the more costly it is for corporate insiders, 
hence the larger the signal sent to outside investors. Doidge et al. (2004) model this trade-off for firms who cross-list 
in the U.S. and use Level 2/3 ADRs (or an ordinary listing) as a bonding device.   
4 
 
more-established counterparts. In addition to the RE/TE ratio, we employ a range of lifecycle measures 
such as firm age, size- and industry-adjusted age, multiclass linear discriminant analysis, and the composite 
proxy developed by Dickinson (2011). To the best of our knowledge, no study of the lifecycle model of 
dividends to date has used this wide range of lifecycle indicators. Using more than one lifecycle proxy 
insures that our findings are not driven by one specific lifecycle measure and allows us to assess the 
interpretation of some of these measures in a low-disclosure regime.     
 Our results produce a number of interesting findings. Firstly, firms engage in reputation-building 
behaviour. Firms with relatively larger growth opportunities tend to pay larger dividends, in contrast to 
the findings for firms in more developed, high-disclosure regimes. Secondly, reputation building through 
dividend payout policy is not the sole preserve of early-stage firms. We find that such behaviour is also a 
characteristic of mature firms, i.e. mature firms with relatively higher growth opportunities continue to 
pay higher dividends to signal to potential investors that they are committed to protecting external 
providers of capital. Thirdly, the evidence supports the lifecycle model of dividends. Dividends increase 
over the lifecycle and peak during the mature stage. However, this story emerges because both growth- 
and mature-stage firms pursue reputation-building strategies. 
 Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our four lifecycle proxies and contains a 
description of the data. Section 3 presents our empirical methodology and discusses our results. Finally, 
section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Lifecycle proxies and other data 
2.1 Lifecycle proxies 
There are many lifecycle proxies proposed in the extant literature. Recent work suggests lifecycle 
proxies can conflict with one another (Von Eije and Megginson, 2008; and Banyi and Kahle, 2014), which 
suggests that reliance on a single lifecycle proxy is potentially problematic and/or existing proxies may be 
open to alternative interpretations. We use four lifecycle proxy measures. First, following DeAngelo et al. 
(2006), we use the ratio of retained earnings to total equity (RE/TE) (or assets, RE/TA), where total 
equity (TE) is the sum of retained (RE) and contributed equity. The underlying premise is that young 
firms have little or no retained equity and rely on contributed (external) equity, resulting in low RE/TE 
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ratios. In contrast, mature firms with positive net cash inflows from operations coupled with a 
diminishing investment opportunity set have greater access to internal funds (retained equity) and less 
need for contributed equity. Hence, mature firms are expected to have large RE/TE ratios.   
Second, we employ the lifecycle proxy of Dickinson (2011). It classifies firms into one of five 
lifecycle stages, namely introduction (birth), growth, maturity, shake-out and decline based on the 
combined signs of net cash flows from operating, financing, and investing activities. Net cash flows can 
be positive or negative, resulting in eight possible cash flow combinations.4 Firm classification is 
grounded in economic theory. For example, firms in the introductory stage invest more than they divest, 
spend more cash than they can generate internally, and issue more capital than they retire/repurchase, 
resulting in negative net cash flows from investments and operations, and a positive net cash flow from 
financing. In our empirical application, we follow Faff et al. (2016) in combining the shake-out and 
decline stages.  
Third, we use the multiclass linear discriminant analysis (MLDA) of Faff et al. (2016), to classify 
firms into one of four lifecycle stages. This approach initially follows Dickinson (2011) to allocate firms to 
a lifecycle stage but then refines the classification by performing linear discriminant analysis, such as:  
i 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i iGroup AGE RE / TE PROFIT SGrowth= α + α + α + α + α + ε , 
where age is firm age, RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity, PROFIT is return on assets 
(EBIT/Assets), and SGrowth is one-year sales growth. Using these variables, MLDA provides maximum 
separation between the groups. A benefit that MLDA and Dickinson (2011) has over RE/TE is that it 
explicitly classifies firms into a lifecycle stage. In contrast, RE/TE provides no objective cut-off point to 
delineate between lifecycle stages. The MLDA overcomes some of the problems inherent in the 
Dickinson (2011) approach and hence is expected to yield a more accurate method of allocating firms to a 
lifecycle stage.5 Thus, MLDA is our preferred lifecycle indicator and is our main reference point. 
Finally, we use firm age. Many papers have suggested that firm age is an imperfect lifecycle proxy. 
Rather than increase monotonically with maturity, the ‘firm age-maturity’ relationship is inverted u-
shaped; by definition, new firms are young in age but are also more likely to fail meaning that young firms 
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1 for these eight cash flow combinations.   
5 Faff et al. (2016, pp. 98) provide a number of arguments as to why MLDA is a superior lifecycle classification 
system. 
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can occupy the introduction and decline lifecycle stages. The time required for firms to reach maturity 
varies across industries. An old firm is not necessarily a mature firm and similarly, a young firm may not 
be a growth firm. We use age plus industry- and size-adjusted age. Age is sourced from Black et al. (2014) 
and we follow Faff et al. (2016) in adjusting firm age by industry and size to account for cross-sectional 
age differences across industries and firm size. The adjustments are implemented by, first, assigning firms 
to an industry based on 2-digit SIC codes. Second, for each industry firms are sorted into size-based 
quintiles. Then, age is regressed on industry and size dummies. Industry- and size-adjusted firm age is 
calculated as the percentile rank of the residual from this age regression. Von Eije and Megginson (2008) 
suggest that firm age measures calendar age while RE/TE captures ‘financial age’.     
     
2.2 Other variables          
Korea is chosen as it is a large market, where firms have a strong incentive to engage in 
reputation-building strategies to overcome country-level barriers to investment and hence provides an 
interesting study of the dividend-lifecycle model in an emerging market.6 As a country, it has relatively 
low-disclosure standards. Its CIFAR score of 68 places it in the bottom tercile of the CIFAR score 
distribution.7 Furthermore, Korea of civil law origin provides relatively weak protection of minority 
shareholders with La Porta et al. (1998) showing that its Rule of Law and Efficiency of Judicial System 
scores (5.35 and 6 respectively) are well below the average for common-law countries (6.46 and 8.15 
respectively) and far removed from the U.S. market (who scores 10 on each measure).  
From Worldscope, we source a full list of Korean firms, both dead and alive, over the period 
from 1996 to 2004. Our sample stops in 2004 because we use the Black et al. (2014) corporate 
governance scores which are only available over this period. We exclude firms in the financial and utility 
industries and firms with negative total equity, missing retained equity, and missing control variables. 
Once we exclude firms with missing TE and RE, all firms have non-negative RE. Our final sample of 
firms is described in Table 1. There are 435 individual firms, providing 1,810 firm-year observations. The 
vast majority (86 percent) of firms are in manufacturing, 79 belong to a Chaebol (business group) and 79 
                                                 
6 Korea has been the focus of a number of influential single-country studies, e.g. Baek et al. (2004), Choe et al. 
(2005), Black et al. (2006) and Bae and Goyal (2010) among others. 
7 The CIFAR disclosure index captures the accounting disclosure standards in a given country by examining annual 
reports for the inclusion or exclusion of 85 key items. 
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are cross-listed in the United States. Of the 435 firms, 48 remain in the sample throughout, while 32 are 
in the sample for just a single-year. The number of firm-year observations peaks at 335 in 2001.  
We measure dividend payout using dividends-to-sales, dividends-to-assets, and ‘payer’. 
Dividends-to-sales (assets) are measured as total common dividends scaled by total sales (assets). ‘Payer’ is 
a binary dummy variable which equals one if the firm pays a dividend in year t and zero otherwise. It is 
common in empirical studies of dividend payout to control for firm-specific determinants of this policy, 
and we control for firms’ growth opportunities, corporate governance, total equity (as opposed to 
retained equity), firm size, cash holdings, profitability, asset tangibility, leverage, and cash flow 
uncertainty.   
We use market-to-book of assets (MBA) to control for growth opportunities. Adam and Goyal 
(2008) show that a firm’s investment opportunity set is best proxied by MBA. We calculate the rank decile 
MBA on an annual basis based on a 3-year average (including the current year).8 La Porta et al. (2000) 
show that dividends can be an outcome of, or substitute for, governance and hence we include the 
corporate governance scores of Black et al. (2014) in our analysis. Following DeAngelo et al. (2006), we 
include both RE/TE and the ratio of total equity to total assets (TE/TA) in our regressions to distinguish 
the impact of total equity financing (TE) from the composition of equity financing (RE/TE). They find 
that dividend payout is positively related to both retained and total equity and hence both the 
composition (RE/TE) and size (TE/TA) of total equity influences dividend payout. Firm size is the rank 
decile of assets (in dividends-to-sales regressions) and rank decile of sales (in dividends-to-assets 
regressions). Cash holdings is cash to assets, profitability is measured as operating income (EBIT) to book 
assets, asset tangibility is gross property plant and equipment (PPE) to assets, leverage is captured by total 
debt to book assets, and following Chay and Suh (2009), cash flow uncertainty is measured as the 
standard deviation of operating income to total assets over the most recent four years. Furthermore, we 
include a ‘Chaebol’ dummy which is one if the firm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise. 
There is little consensus on the payout policies of Chaebol and non-Chaebol (independent) firms. Gul 
and Kealey (1999) find no difference in dividend payout between the two groups, while Hwang et al. 
(2013) conclude that dividends paid by Chaebol firms are lower than independent firms. In all 
                                                 
8 Gan et al. (2013) capture the “reputation-building” effect using the rank decile of sales growth (using a 5-year 
median). We use three as opposed to five years to reduce the attrition rate in our sample. 
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regressions, we include a full set of industry and time dummies. Appendix 2 describes all variables and 
presents summary statistics for our sample of Korean firms.    
  Panel B of Table 1 reports the number of firm-year observations in each lifecycle stage 
according to MLDA and Dickinson (2011) and the mobility of firms across the lifecycle stages. Using 
MLDA, there are more firm-year observations in the introduction (506) and mature (681) stages than in 
growth and shake-out/decline lifecycle stages (193 in growth-stages and 430 in shake-out/decline-stages). 
15 firms occupy all four lifecycle stages; 76 (165) occupy 3 (2) stages, while 179 firms remain in a single 
lifecycle stage. Based on Dickinson’s classification, the number of firm-years is 152, 412, 760, and 486 in 
the introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline stages, respectively.  Similar to MLDA, we 
observe a strong propensity to transit across states with 50 firms appearing in all four stages over the 
sample period. Only 83 firms remain in one lifecycle stage throughout, with all the others displaying some 
mobility across the lifecycle spectrum. Some firms exhibit a simple lifecycle progression from birth to 
decline, but many do not. It is not uncommon to see firms move back along the lifecycle (e.g. mature 
stage followed by growth stage), or skip a stage altogether. Miller and Friesen (1984) observe similar 
lifecycle dynamics in their five-stage lifecycle model. 
Using MLDA as a benchmark, Panel C compares the lifecycle classifications. As expected, the 
median RE/TE and RE/TA increase as firms progress along their lifecycles, peaking during the mature 
stage before declining again during the shake-out/decline phase. For the Dickinson measure, we present 
the percentage of overlapping firm-years with the MLDA classification and we find that the degree of 
overlap is relatively low. For example, only 13.44% of firm-years belong to both the introduction stage 
according to MLDA and Dickinson. The corresponding figures for growth, mature and shake-
out/decline stages are 24.35, 50.66 and 24.88%, respectively. Interestingly, it is mature, and not growth 
firms which score highest in terms of growth opportunities. Firm age increases monotonically as firms 
mature. However, if we separate shake-out from decline firms, we observe the inverted u-shaped relation 
between firm age and lifecycle as anticipated.  
Table 2 investigates if there is any preliminary evidence consistent with reputation building. 
Panels A and B classify firms by growth opportunity quartiles and presents median dividend payouts for 
each. Panel A shows a strong positive relationship between growth opportunities and dividend payout, 
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consistent with reputation building. Firms in the highest MBA quartile pay the largest dividends. Panel B 
shows that as firms’ transition across MBA quartiles, dividend payouts increase. The largest increases are 
observed for firms transitioning from quartile 3 to 4.   
 
2. Discussion of results 
3.1 Preliminary analysis 
Table 3 groups firms into lifecycle stages using each of our four-lifecycle proxies. MLDA and 
Dickinson use four stages, namely introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline. Using firm age, 
we create age quartiles. We follow Owen and Yawson (2010) and partition firms into one of three 
lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old, using RE/TE (what we term RE/TE LC). Young (old) 
firms belong to the group of firms in the lowest (highest) 25%. All other firms are classified as mature. 
Dividend payout is proxied using dividends-to-sales (%), and dividends-to-assets (%). MLDA, Dickinson, 
and RE/TE present a consistent story for the relationship between lifecycle stage and dividend payout 
policy. Dividend payout increases as firms mature, and mature/old firms pay the largest dividends of all 
firms. MLDA and Dickinson agree on the nature of the dividend-lifecycle relationship, although the 
differences in dividend payouts between lifecycle stages is more pronounced using the former. For 
example, using dividends-to-sales, the median growth firm pays almost the same dividend amount in both 
classification schemes. However, the median mature firm’s dividend payout is 0.89 under MLDA, yet just 
0.62 under Dickinson. The bottom rows of Table 3 say that dividend payouts fall as firms age.      
 In Table 4 we show how dividends change for firms who transition between lifecycle stages. We 
focus on transitions from introduction to growth and growth to mature (old using RE/TE) lifecycle 
stages, and present transitions from quartiles 1 to 2, 2 to 3, and 3 to 4, using firm age. The number of 
transition firms is reported in parentheses. In general, dividend payouts increase as firms transition along 
their lifecycle. The size of the dividend changes differs by transition type. Under MLDA, the largest 
increase in dividend payouts occurs when firms transition from the introduction to the growth stage. 
Interestingly, growth firms continue to increase dividends once they mature. Dickinson and RE/TE say 
that the largest change in dividend payouts is observed when young/growth firms reach the mature stage. 
However, since growth firms always pay larger dividends once they mature, the analysis presented in 
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Tables 3 and 4 present a version of the lifecycle model of dividends whereby mature firms pay larger 
dividends than growth firms, irrespective of the lifecycle measure employed.        
  
3.2 Regression based tests of the lifecycle model of dividends 
We estimate dividend payout regressions for the dividend amount (equation 1) and the likelihood 
of a firm paying a dividend (equation 2). The equations are specified as follows: 
it 1 2 it it t i itDiv LIFE CYCLE Controls Year Industry e= α + α − + β + + +  (1) 
( ) ( )it 1 2 it it t iPr ob Payer 1 F LIFE CYCLE Controls Year Industry= = α + α − + β + +  (2) 
The dividend amount equations are estimated using ordinary least squares with standard errors clustered 
by firms (Petersen, 2009), while the payer specification is estimated using logistic regression. Each 
regression contains a full set of firm, industry and time controls. We include the MBA-decile in our 
regressions to capture reputation-building and not lifecycle effects per se, even though finance theory 
implies that MBA falls as firms mature.9 
Table 5 presents our coefficient estimates from estimating equation 1 using dividends-to-sales 
(%) and dividends-to-assets (%). We estimate equation 1 separately for each of our lifecycle proxies. The 
estimated coefficient for RE/TE (and RE/TA, unreported) is positive and significant which is consistent 
with the lifecycle hypothesis proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006). The same pattern emerges when we use 
RE/TE LC, since we observe that firms in later lifecycle stages pay larger dividends. Simultaneously, the 
coefficient on TE/TA is positive and highly significant, which suggests that both total equity (TE/TA) 
and the retained proportion of total equity (RE/TE) matter for the dividend amount. These same 
dividend-lifecycle patterns emerge when we use MLDA, and to a lesser extent Dickinson, to proxy for 
lifecycle. RE/TE is excluded where lifecycle is proxied using MLDA because MLDA uses RE/TE to 
classify firms to lifecycle stages. Table 5 also reports results for pairwise tests for differences in dividend 
payout policy across lifecycle stages. Using MLDA, dividend payouts are always larger for mature firms 
when compared to all other lifecycle stages.  
                                                 
9 A concern is RE/TE may be correlated with MBA and other variables capturing lifecycle effects. However, in our 
sample, the correlations between these variables are small (e.g. the correlation between RE/TE and MBA is just 
0.13) which may explain why MBA and RE/TE are both statistically significant in our tests. One-year sales growth 
is not included in our regressions as sales growth and MBA are highly correlated. 
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Using Dickinson, mature firms pay larger dividends (as a percentage of assets) than introduction 
and growth firms, although the differences in dividend payouts between the lifecycle stages are much 
lower than those recorded for the MLDA classification. Finally, we find that dividend payouts fall as 
firms age – the estimated coefficient for firm age is negative and statistically significant. When we classify 
firms using either Dickinson or firm age and include RE/TE as a regressor, it retains its statistical 
significance. This finding suggests that the RE/TE variable may not be capturing all of the lifecycle effect 
or possibly it may be capturing a different effect.   
Going beyond the lifecycle measure, we find that the estimated coefficient on the MBA decile 
variable is positive and statistically significant using dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets. This is 
consistent with results in Aivazian et al. (2003) for their sample of emerging market firms and that firms 
with abundant growth opportunities pay large dividends to build reputation and foster trust and strong 
bonds with external stakeholders. Few of the control variables are statistically significant. The relationship 
between corporate governance and dividends is positive lending support to the agency outcome model of 
dividends. Cash flow uncertainty is negatively related to payout. As in Hwang et al. (2013), we find that 
Chaebol firms pay smaller dividends than non-business group firms. Leverage and cash holdings are 
statistically significant determinants of dividend payout in the MLDA specification alone, where MBA 
decile, firm size, RE/TE, and TE/TA are excluded. None of the other control variables appear to 
influence dividend payout policy.     
Table 6 presents the marginal effects from the logit regression (equation 2).10 RE/TE (and 
RE/TA, unreported) is always positive and a statistically significant determinant of the decision to pay a 
dividend. RE/TE LC confirms these findings by showing that mature firms are more likely to pay a 
dividend when compared to young firms (but not old firms). Different patterns emerge using MLDA and 
Dickinson. The former suggests that from growth through shake-out/decline, there is no statistical 
difference in the propensity to pay a dividend; while the latter has a similar finding for growth and mature 
firms, it finds that firms in the shake-out/decline stage pay significantly lower dividends than earlier-stage 
firms.    
                                                 
10 As a robustness test, we follow DeAngelo et al. (2006) and include an indicator variable which is 1 if the firm paid 
a dividend in the previous year. Estimated coefficients for RE/TE and RE/TA are reduced, sometimes by more 
than half, but they always remain statistically significant. Other variables are unaffected by its inclusion. Coefficients 
on the lagged dividend variable are always positive, consistent with the stylized fact that dividends tend to be sticky.      
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The estimated coefficient on the MBA decile variable which was positive and statistically 
significant using dividends-to-sales and dividends-to-assets, loses statistical significance in the dividend 
payer regressions. This implies that firms with relatively large growth opportunities are no more likely to 
pay dividends but when they do, they tend to be larger. In the payer regressions, it is only size, 
profitability, and cash flow uncertainty, and to a lesser extent TE/TA, which are consistent and reliable 
determinants of dividend payout. Larger firms with stable cash flows (profits) pay dividends.11   
In Tables 7 and 8 we explore in detail the influence of growth opportunities (MBA) on dividend 
payouts, and in particular on the dividend-lifecycle relationship. In Table 7 we estimate equation 1 
separately for each MLDA lifecycle stage and assess the influence of the MBA decile variable on dividend 
payouts in each lifecycle stage. In the bottom rows of Table 7, we report the proportion of the total 
explained variation in dividend payouts attributable to each variable. Interestingly while we find that the 
growth opportunities measure is a statistically significant determinant of dividend payout in all four 
lifecycle stages, they exert their largest influence in the mature lifecycle stage. The estimated coefficient on 
the MBA decile variable is largest for mature firms, and growth opportunities explain almost a third of the 
total variation in dividend payouts. For firms in the growth stage, the corresponding figure is 20%. Only 
TE/TA is more important than growth opportunities in explaining the variation in dividend payout, in 
the growth and mature lifecycle stage. These findings suggest that firms with relatively large growth 
opportunities use dividends to build reputation capital regardless of lifecycle stage, and reputation 
building is not restricted to firms in the “growth” lifecycle stage.   
In Table 8, we explore this issue further by estimating dividend-lifecycle regressions by strength 
of growth opportunities (above- and below-median MBA). If reputation building is predominantly 
practiced by early-stage firms, then we may expect that for firms with relatively large growth 
opportunities, the differential in dividend payouts between growth and mature firms should narrow 
relative to that observed for firms with low growth opportunities and relative to the whole sample. This is 
not what we observe. Irrespective of the level of growth opportunities, mature firms always pay larger 
dividends than firms in the introduction stage and, using dividends-to-assets, they also pay larger 
dividends than growth firms. Even given large growth opportunities, the collective analysis presented in 
                                                 
11 Appendix 3 presents results of robustness checks, which show that our dividend-lifecycle tests are robust to 
different MLDA specifications.  
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Tables 7 and 8 suggest that if anything, reputation building serves to maintain, and not reduce, the 
difference in dividend payouts that exists between firms in growth and mature lifecycle stages.   
      
3. Conclusion 
We analyze the influence of reputation building on the dividend-lifecycle relationship in a low-
disclosure regime where the incentives for firms to undertake confidence building strategies with 
investors are strong. Since DeAngelo et al. (2006), scaled measures of retained equity, RE/TE and 
RE/TA, have been widely used as firm lifecycle indicators in the literature. However, this result is based 
on a sample of U.S. firms. Supporting international evidence from Denis and Osobov (2008) also comes 
from developed financial markets with high-disclosure requirements and strong investor protection. Here, 
we focus on the dividend payout-lifecycle relationship for Korea. To better understand the evolution of 
dividends in a relatively low-disclosure environment, we utilise, not only the aforementioned RE/TE 
lifecycle indicator, but a range of such indicators drawn from the extant literature, such as firm age, 
Dickinson (2011) and the MLDA methodology of Faff et al (2016). 
Focusing on the lifecycle model of dividends, the different classification methods tell a broadly 
similar story and are supportive of the model. Dividends increase across the lifecycle spectrum, peaking in 
the mature stage before falling in the final shakeout / decline stage. However, reputation building also 
plays a significant role in determining the size of dividend payouts. Contrary to the premise underlying the 
adoption of RE/TE as a lifecycle indicator, we find that dividends are positively related to growth 
opportunities, implying that firms use dividend policy to reassure investors and thereby build reputation 
to overcome country-level institutional barriers to investment. Furthermore, the largest growth of 
dividends is observed for firms transitioning from the third to the fourth quartile of growth opportunities. 
Partitioning the sample into above- and below-median growth firms, confirms this finding with the 
relatively higher growth group paying higher dividends and the differential between dividends paid by 
mature and growth firms persisting. Therefore, it appears that reputation building is a motive for paying 
larger dividends for firms across all lifecycle stages and not solely associated with early-stage firms.  
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Table 1 
Sample and lifecycle descriptions 
This table summarizes our sample of firms. We report the number of firms by industry, the number of firm-year 
observations in total and for each year, and the number of firm-year observations by the number of firms. Industry 
is based on local Korea Republic industry codes mapped to U.S. 2-digit SIC. Financial and utility firms are excluded. 
Crosslist (Chaebol) refers to the number of firm-years in which firms are cross-listed in the United States of any 
cross-listing type (belong to a business group). The sample period is 1998-2004. Panel B reports the number of firm-
year observations in each lifecycle stage and reports whether firms belong in one or multiple lifecycle stages over the 
sample period using Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA) and Dickinson (2011). The Dickinson (2011) 
lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and 
shake-out/decline. Panel C reports median RE/TE, RE/TA, firm age, MBA decile for each MLDA lifecycle stage.  
Panel C also reports the percentage of firms that are in the same lifecycle stage according to MLDA and Dickinson 
(2011).   
Panel A: Number of observations by industry, year, firm, and firm-type 
 
Number of firms by industry Number of 
observations by year 
Observations by 
firms 
Firms by firm type 
Industry # Firms Year # Obs # 
Obs 
# Firms Firm 
type 
# Obs 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 2 1998 151 1 32 Chaebol 79 
Mining 2 1999 182 2 52 Crosslist 79 
Construction 27 2000 320 3 82  
Manufacturing 373 2001 335 4 76 
Wholesale Trade 20 2002 261 5 82 
Retail Trade 7 2003 282 6 63 
Services 4 2004 279 7 48 
 435  1,810  435 
Panel B: Number of firm-years in each lifecycle stage and the number of lifecycle stages by firm 
 
Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA) Dickinson (2011) 
Introduction 506 1 Stage 179 Introduction 152 1 Stage 83 
Growth 193 2 Stages 165 Growth 412 2 Stages 168 
Mature 681 3 Stages 76 Mature 760 3 Stages 134 
Shake-out/decline 430 4 Stages 15 Shake-out/decline 486 4 Stages 50 
 1,810  435  1,810  435 
Panel C: Relationship between lifecycle proxies and MBA by MLDA lifecycle stage  
 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
RE/TE 0.17 0.32 0.58 0.25 
RE/TA 0.06 0.15 0.34 0.11 
Dickinson (2011) 13.44% 24.35% 50.66% 24.88% 
Age 28 32 35 45 
MBA decile 5 6 7 4 
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Table 2 
Dividend payout and growth opportunities 
This table reports dividend payouts by level of growth opportunities for a sample of 435 Korea Republic firms over 
the period from 1998-2004. Growth opportunities are measured using market-to-book of assets (MBA). Dividend 
payout is measured using dividends-to-sales (%) and dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. Panel A reports median 
dividend payout by MBA quartile. Panel B reports the level and percentage change in median dividend payout when 
firms transition across MBA quartiles. The number of transitions are reported in parentheses. Date ‘t’ is the 
transition year. %∆ is the percentage change in median dividend payout between dates t-1 and t.           
Panel A: Dividend payout by MBA quartile 
 
 MBA quartile 1 MBA quartile 2 MBA quartile 3 MBA quartile 4 
Div-Sales (%) 0.29 0.50 0.51 0.79 
Div-Assets (%) 0.21 0.51 0.52 0.79 
Panel B: Change in dividend payout by transitions in MBA quartiles  
 
 MBA quartile 1 to 2 
(68) 
MBA quartile 2 to 3 
(63) 
MBA quartile 3 to 4 
(59) 
 t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ 
Div-Sales (%) 0.42 0.46 9.52 0.33 0.42 27.27 0.45 0.78 73.33 
Div-Assets (%) 0.34 0.45 32.35 0.39 0.50 28.21 0.48 0.71 47.92 
 
 
Table 3 
Dividend payout in each lifecycle stage 
This table reports median dividend payout by lifecycle stage. Lifecycle is proxied using Multiclass Linear 
Discriminant Analysis (MLDA), Dickinson (2011), RE/TE, and firm age. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-
asset (%) or dividends-to-sales (%), as indicated. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages 
(introduction, growth, mature, and shakeout/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson 
(2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, 
and shake-out/decline. In Panel C, firms are classified into three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old 
using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile. 
Panel A: Dividend payout and lifecycle using MLDA lifecycle stages 
 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
Div-Sales (%) 0.12 0.45 0.89 0.35 
Div-Assets (%) 0.09 0.48 0.92 0.27 
Panel B: Dividend payout and lifecycle using Dickinson (2011) lifecycle stages 
 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
Div-Sales (%) 0.39 0.46 0.62 0.28 
Div-Assets (%) 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.26 
Panel C: Dividend payout and lifecycle using RE/TE lifecycle stages 
 
 Young Mature Old 
Div-Sales (%) 0.00 0.56 0.82 
Div-Assets (%) 0.00 0.53 0.82 
Panel D: Dividend payout and lifecycle using age quartiles 
 
 Age quartile 1 Age quartile 2 Age quartile 3 Age quartile 4 
Div-Sales (%) 0.58 0.55 0.40 0.40 
Div-Assets (%) 0.63 0.52 0.38 0.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
Table 4 
Lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout 
This table reports median dividend payout as firms’ transition across lifecycle stages. Date ‘t’ is the transition year. 
Lifecycle is proxied using Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA), Dickinson (2011), RE/TE, and firm 
age. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as indicated. In Panel C, firms are 
classified into three lifecycle stages, namely young, mature, and old using RE/TE. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to 
total equity. In Panel D, firms are classified by firm age quartile. The number of transitions is reported in 
parentheses. %∆ is the percentage change in median dividend payout between dates t-1 and t.                 
Panel A: MLDA lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout 
 
 Introduction to growth 
(39) 
Growth to mature 
(44) 
 t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ 
Div-Sales (%) 0.18 0.36 100.0 0.55 0.66 20.0 
Div-Assets (%) 0.22 0.43 95.5 0.47 0.80 70.2 
Panel B: Dickinson (2011) lifecycle transitions and change in dividend payout 
 
 Introduction to growth 
(14) 
Growth to mature 
(74) 
 t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ 
Div-Sales (%) 0.32 0.29 (9.4) 0.43 0.45 4.7 
Div-Assets (%) 0.37 0.43 16.2 0.38 0.49 28.9 
Panel C: RE/TE quartile transitions and change in dividend payout 
 
 Young to mature 
(41) 
Mature to old 
(26) 
 t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ 
Div-Sales (%) 0.20 0.49 145.0 0.60 0.79 31.7 
Div-Assets (%) 0.13 0.38 192.3 0.63 0.77 22.2 
Panel D: Age quartile transitions and change in dividend payout 
 
 Age quartile 1 to 2 
(48) 
Age quartile 2 to 3 
(41) 
Age quartile 3 to 4 
(38) 
 t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ t-1 t %∆ 
Div-Sales (%) 0.28 0.60 114.3 0.40 0.48 20.0 0.36 0.43 19.4 
Div-Assets (%) 0.23 0.70 204.3 0.35 0.47 34.3 0.25 0.37 48.0 
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Table 5 
Regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship  
This table reports pooled ordinary least squares estimates for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 1998 to 
2004. The dependent variable is dividend payout. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-
assets (%), as indicated. The standard errors are clustered by firm. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. 
RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using 
RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-
out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years 
into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. Firm age is size and 
industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). All other variables are defined in the text. Firm-
growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-
book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time 
dummies but are not reported. 
 Dependent variable is Div-Sales (%)  
 Lifecycle measure 
 RE/TE RE/TE LC MLDA Dickinson 
(2011) 
Firm age 
RE/TE  0.401*** 
(4.49) 
  0.410*** 
(4.61) 
0.405*** 
(4.59) 
Growth   0.081*** 
(1.22) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
 
Mature  0.246*** 
(4.83) 
0.261*** 
(3.48) 
0.024 
(0.45) 
 
Shake-out/decline   0.037 
(0.66) 
0.061 
(1.12) 
 
Old 
 
 0.351*** 
(4.37) 
   
Firm age 
 
    -0.0001*** 
(2.54) 
      
MBA decile 0.069*** 
(6.80) 
0.070*** 
(6.83) 
 0.070*** 
(6.83) 
0.064*** 
(6.43) 
Corporate governance 0.007** 
(2.05) 
0.007* 
(1.90) 
0.013*** 
(3.33) 
0.007** 
(2.02) 
0.008** 
(2.16) 
Chaebol dummy -0.098 
(1.33) 
-0.103 
(1.38) 
-0.117 
(1.50) 
-0.095 
(1.29) 
-0.112 
(1.54) 
Size decile 0.020 
(1.38) 
0.021 
(1.49) 
-0.013 
(0.94) 
0.019 
(1.35) 
0.021 
(1.46) 
Cash/Assets 0.432 
(1.07) 
0.497 
(1.24) 
1.182** 
(2.57) 
0.447 
(1.11) 
0.332 
(0.80) 
Profitability 0.171 
(0.40) 
0.091 
(0.21) 
 0.191 
(0.45) 
0.090 
(0.21) 
TE/TA 2.123*** 
(8.37) 
1.970*** 
(7.57) 
 2.108*** 
(8.42) 
2.187*** 
(8.67) 
Leverage 0.182 
(0.82) 
0.108 
(0.48) 
-1.476*** 
(6.62) 
0.192 
(0.86) 
0.190 
(0.87) 
PPE/Assets 0.055 
(0.31) 
0.052 
(0.29) 
0.195 
(1.10) 
0.064 
(0.37) 
0.047 
(0.27) 
Cash flow uncertainty -1.064*** 
(4.45) 
-0.962*** 
(4.01) 
-1.192*** 
(4.83) 
-1.083*** 
(4.50) 
-1.038*** 
(4.28) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 
R-Squared 0.343 0.343 0.240 0.344 0.349 
Growth vs. mature   **   
Mature vs. shake-
out/decline 
  ***   
 Dependent variable is Div-Assets (%)  
 Lifecycle measure 
 RE/TE RE/TE LC MLDA Dickinson 
(2011) 
Firm age 
20 
 
Table 5 
Regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship  
This table reports pooled ordinary least squares estimates for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 1998 to 
2004. The dependent variable is dividend payout. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-
assets (%), as indicated. The standard errors are clustered by firm. RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. 
RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third quartile), or old (top quartile), using 
RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-
out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years 
into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-out/decline. Firm age is size and 
industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). All other variables are defined in the text. Firm-
growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-
book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an intercept term, industry and time 
dummies but are not reported. 
RE/TE  0.329*** 
(4.26) 
  0.342*** 
(4.47) 
0.334*** 
(4.40) 
Growth   0.138** 
(2.41) 
-0.063 
(1.33) 
 
Mature  0.209*** 
(4.63) 
0.346*** 
(5.69) 
0.013 
(0.27) 
 
Shake-out/decline   -0.010 
(0.20) 
0.021 
(0.45) 
 
Old 
 
 0.314*** 
(4.43) 
   
Firm age 
 
    -0.0001*** 
(3.21) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 
R-Squared 0.343 0.380 0.279 0.344 0.349 
Growth vs. mature   *** *  
Growth vs. shake-
out/decline 
  *** **  
Mature vs. shake-
out/decline 
  ***   
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Table 6 
Payer regression estimates of the dividend-lifecycle relationship 
This table reports marginal effects from a series of logit regressions for the full sample of firms. The sample period is 
1998 to 2004. The dependent variable is Div-Payer, which is 1 if the firm pays a dividend in time t, zero otherwise. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm. The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of each variable. RE/TE is 
the ratio of retained to total equity. RE/TE LC classifies firms as young (bottom quartile), mature (second and third 
quartile), or old (top quartile), using RE/TE. MLDA classifies firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, 
growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. The Dickinson (2011) lifecycle 
approach groups firm-years into one of four lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, maturity, and shake-
out/decline. Firm age is size and industry adjusted. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). All other 
variables are defined in the text. Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the 
rank decile of the average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. All regressions include an 
intercept term, industry and time dummies but they are not reported. 
 Dependent variable is Div-Payer 
 Lifecycle measure 
 RE/TE RE/TE LC MLDA Dickinson 
(2011) 
Firm age 
RE/TE  0.335*** 
(10.57) 
  0.321*** 
(7.09) 
0.334*** 
(8.22) 
Growth   0.115*** 
(8.03) 
0.010 
(0.35) 
 
Mature  0.148*** 
(6.48) 
0.204*** 
(8.44) 
0.008 
(0.41) 
 
Shake-out/decline   0.064*** 
(4.47) 
-0.056* 
(1.95) 
 
Old 
 
 0.149*** 
(7.21) 
   
Firm age 
 
    0.000 
(0.86) 
      
MBA decile -0.002 
(0.86) 
-0.002 
(0.78) 
 -0.004 
(1.29) 
-0.002 
(0.74) 
Corporate governance 0.002 
(1.45) 
0.001 
(1.20) 
0.001 
(1.10) 
0.002 
(1.56) 
0.001 
(1.43) 
Chaebol dummy 0.009 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.003 
(0.12) 
0.008 
(0.44) 
0.011 
(0.59) 
Size decile 0.011*** 
(2.95) 
0.014*** 
(3.25) 
0.011*** 
(2.25) 
0.011*** 
(2.76) 
0.011*** 
(2.84) 
Cash/Assets 0.076 
(0.68) 
0.143 
(1.10) 
0.383*** 
(3.18) 
0.060 
(0.54) 
0.085 
(0.77) 
Profitability 1.169*** 
(4.46) 
1.362*** 
(4.77) 
 1.099*** 
(3.98) 
1.165*** 
(4.20) 
TE/TA 0.295*** 
(4.05) 
0.317*** 
(3.85) 
 0.312*** 
(3.93) 
0.288*** 
(3.79) 
Leverage -0.093 
(1.33) 
-0.132* 
(1.65) 
-0.381*** 
(5.23) 
-0.086 
(1.21) 
-0.093 
(1.35) 
PPE/Assets -0.013 
(0.27) 
-0.014 
(0.24) 
0.041 
(0.70) 
-0.027 
(0.53) 
-0.014 
(0.29) 
Cash flow uncertainty -0.816*** 
(3.81) 
-0.863*** 
(3.44) 
-1.131*** 
(2.78) 
-0.780*** 
(3.77) 
-0.817*** 
(3.64) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 1,810 
R-Squared 0.378 0.402 0.306 0.379 0.386 
Growth vs. mature      
Growth vs. shake-out/decline    ***  
Mature vs. shake-out/decline    ***  
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Table 7 
The determinants of dividend payout in each MLDA lifecycle stage 
This table reports separate pooled ordinary least squares estimates for each lifecycle stage. The sample period is 1998 
to 2004. The dependent variable is dividends-to-sales (%). The standard errors are clustered by firm. Lifecycle stages 
are determined using Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA). MLDA classifies firms into one of four 
lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear discriminant analysis. 
RE/TE is the ratio of retained to total equity. Corporate governance is from Black et al. (2014). Firm-growth is 
proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the average market-to-book of 
assets based on the previous three years. All other variables are defined in the text. All regressions include an intercept 
term, industry and time dummies but are not reported. The bottom panel outlines the amount of the variation in 
dividend payout explained by each right hand side variable as a percentage of the variation in dividend payout 
explained by the right hand side variables as a whole.   
 Dependent variable is Div-Sales (%) 
 Lifecycle stage according to MLDA 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
MBA decile 0.033*** 
(2.96) 
0.089*** 
(3.79) 
0.109*** 
(5.50) 
0.051*** 
(3.05) 
RE/TE  0.660*** 
(5.75) 
0.476*** 
(2.16) 
0.408* 
(1.79) 
0.149 
(0.99) 
Corporate governance 0.004 
(1.10) 
-0.010 
(1.36) 
0.014** 
(2.08) 
0.006 
(1.10) 
Chaebol dummy -0.079 
(0.90) 
-0.088 
(0.61) 
-0.137 
(0.94) 
-0.175 
(1.58) 
Size decile 0.040*** 
(2.64) 
0.038* 
(1.66) 
-0.013 
(0.44) 
0.021 
(0.84) 
Cash/Assets 0.398 
(0.82) 
-0.186 
(0.21) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
2.480*** 
(2.85) 
Profitability 0.008 
(0.02) 
-5.403* 
(1.69) 
-0.376 
(0.34) 
5.928*** 
(4.02) 
TE/TA 1.770*** 
(5.52) 
2.430*** 
(5.16) 
3.182*** 
(6.37) 
1.470*** 
(3.54) 
Leverage -0.120 
(0.55) 
-0.034 
(0.07) 
0.780 
(1.58) 
-0.262 
(0.64) 
PPE/Assets 0.240 
(1.47) 
0.126 
(0.32) 
-0.077 
(0.20) 
0.321 
(0.97) 
Cash flow uncertainty -0.170 
(0.38) 
-1.885*** 
(2.74) 
-0.597 
(1.33) 
-1.139*** 
(2.98) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 506 193 681 430 
R-Squared 0.284 0.336 0.329 0.306 
Median MBA decile 5 6 7 4 
 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
MBA decile 6.31 20.28 32.82 13.41 
RE/TE  39.05 7.13 4.05 1.21 
Corporate governance 0.76 3.12 5.77 1.61 
Chaebol dummy 0.70 0.54 1.14 3.50 
Size decile 5.18 2.87 0.30 1.19 
Cash/Assets 0.67 0.09 0.00 25.94 
Profitability 0.00 3.65 0.10 18.05 
TE/TA 37.12 32.19 41.69 17.27 
Leverage 0.18 0.01 1.87 0.47 
PPE/Assets 1.20 0.15 0.04 1.66 
Cash flow uncertainty 0.10 17.17 0.94 6.03 
Industry dummies 3.37 4.77 5.82 3.77 
Time dummies 5.36 8.03 5.47 5.88 
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Table 8 
The lifecycle model of dividends by level of growth opportunities 
This table examines the lifecycle model of dividends for firms with high MBA (above-median) and low MBA (below-
median). Firm-growth is proxied using the market-to-book of assets (MBA). MBA decile is the rank decile of the 
average market-to-book of assets based on the previous three years. Panel A reports median dividend payout in each 
lifecycle stage by level of firm growth. Dividend payout is either dividends-to-sales (%) or dividends-to-assets (%), as 
indicated. Lifecycle stages are determined using Multiclass Linear Discriminant Analysis (MLDA). MLDA classifies 
firms into one of four lifecycle stages (introduction, growth, mature, and shake-out/decline) using multiclass linear 
discriminant analysis. Panel B reports separate pooled ordinary least squares estimates for firms classified as high 
(above-median) or low (below-median) MBA. The sample period is 1998 to 2004. The standard errors are clustered 
by firm. All regressions include an intercept term, control variables, industry and time dummies but are not reported. 
Panel A: Dividend payouts in each MLDA lifecycle stage by level of growth opportunities 
 
 High MBA Low MBA 
 Div-Sales (%) Div-Assets (%) Div-Sales (%) Div-Assets (%) 
Introduction 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.10 
Growth 0.59 0.65 0.31 0.31 
Mature 1.16 1.16 0.66 0.66 
Shake-out/decline 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.27 
Panel B: Regression based tests of the dividend-lifecycle model by level of growth opportunities  
 
 Dependent variable is Div-Sales (%) Dependent variable is Div-Assets (%) 
 High MBA Low MBA High MBA Low MBA 
Growth 0.102 
(1.06) 
0.026 
(0.29) 
0.199** 
(2.29) 
0.041 
(0.68) 
Mature 0.261*** 
(2.34) 
0.169** 
(2.00) 
0.369*** 
(3.88) 
0.215*** 
(3.34) 
Shake-out/decline 0.117 
(1.43) 
0.070 
(1.04) 
0.083 
(1.17) 
0.012 
(0.26) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included 
Time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
# Observations 904 906 904 906 
R-Squared 0.298 0.140 0.334 0.195 
Growth vs. mature   * ** 
Growth vs. shake-
out/decline 
    
Mature vs. shake-
out/decline 
  *** *** 
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Appendix 1 
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle cash flow patterns classification scheme 
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle approach groups firm-years into one of five lifecycle stages, namely introduction, growth, 
maturity, shake-out, and decline. Each lifecycle stage is determined by the combined signs on net cash flow from 
operating, investing, and financing activities. There are eight different net cash flow permutations.     
Net cash flow and predicted sign: Intro Growth Mature Shake-out Decline 
NCF from operating activities - + + - + + - - 
NCF from investing activities - - - - + + + + 
NCF from financing activities + + - - + - + - 
 Appendix 2 
Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Source Mean Median Std. Dev Min  Max 
Dividends-to-assets (%) Total common dividends to total assets Worldscope 0.67 0.45 0.77 0.00 4.09 
Dividends-to-sales (%) Total common dividends to net sales Worldscope 0.74 0.48 0.89 0.00 4.52 
Payer 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t, 0 otherwise  Worldscope 0.71 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
MBA  Three-year average market to book value of assets Worldscope 0.66 0.45 0.69 0.09 6.35 
RE/TE Retained equity to total equity Worldscope 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.00 4.74 
RE/TA Retained equity to book assets Worldscope 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.83 
MLDA lifecycle  Lifecycle measure using multiclass linear discriminant 
analysis 
Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Dickinson (2011) lifecycle Dickinson (2011) lifecycle measure Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Age Age of firm: year less establishment year plus 1 Black et al. (2014) 35.05 34.00 13.04 1 107 
Corporate governance Corporate governance index Black et al. (2014) 34.40 32.95 10.58 0.00 84.59 
TE/TA Ratio of total equity to book assets Worldscope 0.48 0.47 0.19 (0.04) 0.88 
Size Size rank decile using book assets (in div-sales and 
governance regressions) and sales (in div-assets regressions)  
Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Cash/Assets Ratio of cash to book assets Worldscope 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.64 
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest and taxation to book assets Worldscope 0.03 0.03 0.06 (0.41) 0.24 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to book assets Worldscope 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.00 0.76 
PPE/Assets Ratio of property plant and equipment (PPE) to book assets Worldscope 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.00 0.86 
Chaebol dummy 1 if the firm belongs to business group in year t, 0 otherwise Black et al. (2014) 0.31 0.00 0.46 0 1 
Cash flow uncertainty Standard deviation of (operating income/total assets) over 
the most recent four years 
Worldscope 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.00 1.29 
Industry Dummies Industry codes mapped to US 2-digit SIC codes Worldscope n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. n.m. 
Lifecycle descriptors for Dickinson (2011) and MLDA: 
Variable Description Source Mean Median Std. Dev Min  Max 
Sales growth One-year sales growth Worldscope 0.08 0.08 0.12 (0.36) 0.50 
NCFO Net cash flows from operating activities Worldscope 0.06 0.06 0.09 (0.63) 0.69 
NCFI Net cash flows from investing activities Worldscope 0.04 0.04 0.11 (2.52) 0.55 
NCFF Net cash flows from financing activities Worldscope (0.02) (0.02) 0.10 (1.45) 0.46 
 Appendix 3 
The dividend-lifecycle relationship using alternative MLDA specifications 
This table reports regression based tests of the lifecycle model of dividends using alternative multiple linear 
discriminant analysis (MLDA) specifications. MLDA2 uses sales growth and profitability; MLDA3 uses sales 
growth, profitability, and RE/TE; MLDA4 uses sales growth, profitability, RE/TE, and size; MLDA5 uses sales 
growth, profitability, RE/TE, age, and size. Panel A reports the number of firms in each lifecycle stage and the 
percentage of overlapping firms in each lifecycle stage according to MLDA and Dickinson (2011, DK). 1,810 firm-
year observations are included in each regression.       
Panel A: Comparison between Dickinson (2011) lifecycle and alternative MLDA lifecycle specifications 
 
 Lifecycle stage 
 Introduction Growth Mature Shake-out/decline 
Dickinson (2011) 152 412 760 486 
 
MLDA2 364 332 639 475 
% same as DK (2011) 34.87 25.24 46.97 31.89 
MLDA3 389 370 561 490 
% same as DK (2011) 40.79 29.13 42.11 32.51 
MLDA4 378 405 553 474 
% same as DK (2011) 48.68 33.50 42.63 33.95 
MLDA5 414 398 550 448 
% same as DK (2011) 47.37 32.28 42.11 31.28 
Panel B: Regression based tests of the dividend-lifecycle model using alternative MLDA specifications 
 
 Dependent variable is Div-Sales (%) 
 MLDA2 MLDA3 MLDA4 MLDA5 
Growth 0.030 
(0.61) 
0.216*** 
(2.90) 
0.214*** 
(3.32) 
0.096 
(1.41) 
Mature 0.160** 
(2.14) 
0.363*** 
(5.02) 
0.372*** 
(5.05) 
0.226*** 
(2.93) 
Shake-out/decline 0.106** 
(2.15) 
0.199*** 
(4.12) 
0.223*** 
(4.39) 
0.042 
(0.74) 
RE/TE 0.425*** 
(4.63) 
   
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
R-Squared 0.308 0.246 0.247 0.237 
Growth vs. mature ** * ** * 
Growth vs. shake-out/decline *    
Mature vs. shake-out/decline  ** ** ** 
 Dependent variable is Div-Assets (%) 
 MLDA2 MLDA3 MLDA4 MLDA5 
Growth 0.102** 
(2.50) 
0.254*** 
(4.66) 
0.211*** 
(4.02) 
0.106* 
(1.93) 
Mature 0.350*** 
(5.98) 
0.502*** 
(8.43) 
0.485*** 
(7.84) 
0.326*** 
(5.22) 
Shake-out/decline 0.096*** 
(2.67) 
0.147*** 
(4.13) 
0.189*** 
(4.61) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
RE/TE 0.338*** 
(4.33) 
   
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
R-Squared 0.331 0.294 0.291 0.276 
Growth vs. mature *** *** *** *** 
Growth vs. shake-out/decline  *  * 
Mature vs. shake-out/decline *** *** *** *** 
 
 
 
